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Abstract
Building on the literature of dynamic capability and organizational learning, we examine
strategy execution in hyper-competition as a problem of how organizations can re-configure
their learning capability to match with their radically different learning demands.
Organizations in hyper-competitive environments face an increasing gap between their
learning opportunities and needs, and actual learning performance. In order to survive they
must improve their absorptive capacity so that they can learn simultaneously broad, deep and
fast. We define such a learning contingency as hyper-learning. To do so, the organization
must systematically interlace explorationâ that seeks to maximize learning breadthâ and
exploitationâ that seeks to maximize learning depth. Unlike in traditional learning cycles,
exploration and exploitation during periods of hyper-learning are not insulated from each
other through time or structure. We explore seven software firms engaged in Web system
development during the hey-day on dot.com frenzy and investigate how these companies
were able to hyper-learn. We distinguish two mechanisms to speed up exploration:
distributed gate-keeping and extended grafting of external knowledge; and two mechanisms
to speed up exploitation: simple design patterns and peer networks. These mechanisms were
nearly uniformly recognized in all studied organizations. We also examine the systemic
configuration and patterning of these activities, which enables organizations to learn in high
gear. This organizational learning model is contrasted with the punctuated equilibrium model
of learning articulated in mainstream strategy research. Finally some implications for future
research and management practice are drawn.
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Learning in High Gear: Hyper-learning and Dynamic Capability
in Seven Software Firms
Introduction
In today’s hyper-competitive business environment (D'aveni 1994), a company’s ability
to quickly learn and adapt to the changing environments is key to its success and survival
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Grant 1996, Ilinirtch et al. 1996, Volberda 1996). In such an
environment, traditional strategies that seek sustainable, competitive advantage in the long-term
(Barney 1996, Chandler 1962, Penrose 1959, Porter 1980) are being challenged by
Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934, Young et al. 1996) and hypercompetition (D'aveni 1994). It is no longer sufficient to jockey into a unique position in an
industry (Chandler 1962, Porter 1980) or to possess a configuration of difficult-to-imitate
bundles of resources or routines that guarantee competitive advantage (Barney 1996, Nelson and
Winter 1982, Penrose 1959, Peteraf 1993, Wernerfelt 1984). Strategic frameworks based on
hyper-competition expect continuous and disruptive organizational innovation that continuously
creates temporary disequilibria in the competitive system (Volberda 1996).
To date, research on hyper-competition has focused on the nature and structure of hypercompetitive marketplaces (D'aveni 1994) and has consisted of company-level studies that
explore companies’ strategies through high velocity decision-making and the creation of new
competences (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). What is striking in the
existing research is the scant attention paid to hyper-competitive strategy execution or how
organizations in high-velocity environments manage to rapidly acquire new competencies. This
acquisition of new knowledge represents learning by the organization (D'aveni 1994), or rather
the organization’s learning to learn. Through this learning to learn process, the organization
creates capabilities in order to acquire new capabilities (dynamic capability). A focus on
strategy execution would enable the observation of micro-level learning processes whereby
organizations foster learning. Through these processes, firms subsequently build up pools of
resources and routines that either inhibit or foster the creation of dynamic capability.
Building on the literature of dynamic capability and organizational learning (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995), we examine strategy
execution that takes place during hyper-competition. The objective is to understand how
organizations re-configure their learning capability in order to radically match the new learning
demands posed by hyper-competition. A primary assumption of this paper is that, during hypercompetition, organizations face an increasing gap between their learning opportunities and needs
and actual learning performance. In order to survive and thrive in hypercompetitive situations,
organizations must dramatically increase their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990)
so that they are capable of hyper-learning.
We define hyper-learning as an organizational contingency where an organization must
concurrently learn (a) broadly, (b) deeply and (c) quickly. Traditional views of organizational
learning indicated that firms sought to learn in cycles of exploration (March 1991), which aims
to maximize learning breadth and exploitation (March 1991), which aims to maximize learning
depth. In contrast, in hyper-competitive environments, exploitation and exploration become
inseparable and interlaced. Hyper-learning is thus characterized by compressed time spans for
both exploration and exploitation, and a high level of concurrency between these two. In order
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to hyper-learn, organizations must find the mechanisms to close the gap between exploration and
exploitation. Methods for traditional learning are likely insufficient and how these two end goals
can be successfully merged in time or structure must be understood by those firms entering a
period of hyper-competition.
In order to understand these new processes, the following three research questions are
examined:
Research Question 1: What are the specific mechanisms of hyper-learning in organizations that
radically increase the absorptive capacity in hyper-competition?
Research Question 2: How can such learning mechanisms be configured as core elements of
dynamic capability?
Research Question 3: How does hyper-learning affect organizational design and strategy
execution?
Below, in a replicated case study, the paper examines hyper-learning mechanisms that
were established in seven software development firms (three in the United States and four in
Finland) competing in Web development during the peak of the hyper-competitive electronic
commerce boom (June to December 2000). This boom was characterized by the following:
massive infusions of resources; rapid, radical and pervasive changes to the information
technology base; intense competition between service providers; and unprecedented
requirements for fast time-to-market delivery. The objective of this paper is to seek answers to
the above questions and thus identify the characteristics of hyper-learning in these firms and how
they changed their organizational processes in order to hyper-learn.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 further develops the
concept of hyper-competition and hyper-learning and discusses how it sets new demands for
firms in developing dynamic capability. Section 3 presents the design of the field study and
reports key findings concerning hyper-learning mechanisms in the seven software firms. The
paper concludes by discussing the implications of the data, specifically, how the findings provide
insight into the acquisition and deployment of new capabilities during hyper-competition.
Further, it contrasts these findings with traditional beliefs from the organizational learning,
dynamic capability, and knowledge management literatures.

Theoretical Background: Dynamic Capability and Hyper-learning
Hyper-competition and Dynamic Capability
In the literature, it has been suggested that, in stable competitive environments,
companies can sustain their competitive position by engaging in extensive and prolonged
exploitation processes that are only occasionally punctuated by relatively short and disruptive
discontinuities in markets and technologies (March 1991, Tushman and Anderson 1986).
Through the exploitation processes, firms seek to garner and refine competencies through
repeated actions over extended periods of time (Dierickx and Cool 1989, Eisenhardt and Martin
2000, Nelson and Winter 1982, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), while through explorations they
search and create new competences (Christensen 1997, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Fredickson
1984, Henderson and Clark 1990, Imai et al. 1985, Kim 1998, March 1991, Nonaka 1994, Pisano
1994, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Winter and Szulanski 2001). In such stable environments,
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chaotic and ambiguous explorations of technology and knowledge are exceptions and bricolage
is unrecognized (Ciborra and Lanzara 1994).
However, recent studies on hyper-competition and dynamic capabilities challenge these
views (D'aveni 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Teece et al. 1997).
D’Aveni (1994) defines a hyper-competition as “intense and rapid competitive moves, in which
competitors must move quickly to build advantages and erode the advantages of their rivals” (p.
218). In such high-velocity environments fast change is endemic and it becomes nonlinear and
less predictable with blurring boundaries and ambiguous market players (Eisenhardt and Martin
2000). Drawing from Schumpeter (1934), hyper-competition recognizes the relentless and rapid
pace of innovation among rivals that creates disequilibria in the markets within compressed time
frames through the use of pre-emptive strategies and rapid swings in market competition as a key
characteristic of business environments (D'aveni 1994). In hyper-competitive environments, the
company’s strategic agenda is to increase agility: it must outpace competition by constantly
exploring and pursuing new sources of competitive advantage. Therefore, in a hyper-competitive
market, companies engage in a chain of small, easily duplicated strategies that maximize their
likelihood of survival. Thus, in a hyper-competitive environment, dynamic capability plays a
vital role in creating competitive advantage.
Dynamic capability refers to an ability that alters a company’s resource base through
acquisition, integration, re-combination, and the removal of organizational capabilities
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). It enables companies to relentlessly integrate, reconfigure, gain
and release resources that create and respond to swift and dramatic changes in competition
(D'aveni 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Teece et al. 1997).
Dynamic capability thus embodies a meta-capability by which firms build up new resource
configurations (Teece et al. 1997) and engage in second-order learning, which ischaracterized by
a search for alternative routines, rules, technologies and goals (Lant and Mezias 1992). Dynamic
capability often results from the realization that specific experiences and opportunities cannot be
interpreted within the current theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978).
Together, these concepts offer new theoretical lenses that helps us understand the
importance of dynamic-capability building that underlies effective hyper-competitive strategy.
A growing body of the literature has examined decision processes and organizational designs by
which organizations acquire dynamic capability (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Eisenhardt and
Martin 2000, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Galunic and
Eisenhardt 1996, Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001, Henderson and Cockburn 1994, Henderson and
Clark 1990, Montealegre 2002, Teece et al. 1997). They suggest a different logic for
organizational design that underscores the importance of organizing through semi-structures,
developing simple organizational routines and decision rules and the critical role of experimental
learning and iterative strategy.
The impact of squeezing more into less time—a hallmark of hyper-competition— on
firms’ dynamic capability, however, has not been adequately investigated in the extant literature.
Furthermore, these studies pay scant attention to strategy execution. Specifically, little is
understood as to how organizations in action launch and configure behaviors and specific
learning processes that enable the creation of dynamic capability. This invites investigation into
specific organizational routines and structures as well as the consequent formulation of theories
and concepts that explain how organizations quickly “learn to learn.”

©Sprouts 2(4) pp 160-194, http://sprouts.case.edu/2002/020410.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-16

164

LYYTINEN, ROSE AND YOO/LEARNING IN HIGH GEAR

Dynamic Capability and Hyper-learning
There is a dearth of knowledge regarding what organizations do to dramatically expand
their capability to learn. Expansion of the capability to learn requires that firms decide which
knowledge assets to retain and which ones to purge. Likewise, little is understood with regard to
learning under intense time pressures. While learning under these conditions is not well
understood, these capabilities could well become a main competitive asset in times of hypercompetition. In order to address these gaps in the literature, we propose a notion of hyperlearning.
Building on the organizational learning literature (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, March
1991, Zahra and George 2002), we conceptualize hyper-learning as an organizational attempt to
radically increase absorptive capacity via simultaneously pursuing the exploration “of new
possibilities” and the exploitation “of old certainties” to cope (March 1991) with radically
compressed time demands of hyper-competition (Figure 1). Simply put, hyper-learning requires
an organization to learn broadly, deeply, and quickly at the same time. Absorptive capacity can
be defined as the “ability of a firm to recognize the value of new external (and internal)
information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990 pp.128).
Absorptive capacity is a function of an organization’s prior learning and it shows path
dependencies in cognitive framing (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Thus, a shift to hyper-learning
often requires deep changes in organizations’ cognitive frames and belief systems, thus calling
for second-order learning.
Speed

Move to hyperlearning

Breadth:
Focus on
exploration

Depth:
Focus on
exploitation

Figure 1. Pressures Towards Hyper-learning

The need to rapidly increase absorptive capacity must thereby address how much an
organization is proportionally engaged in these activities and when and how they become
interlinked through communications, knowledge sharing principles, incentives and culture
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). First, in order to increase the breadth of learning, an organization
must expand quickly in a given time period relative to its resource pool. Moreover, the
organization faces higher uncertainty as to what topics may be relevant for its future
competitiveness so the risk of learning something that quickly become irrelevant is high.
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Stable and Narrow
Dynamic and Broad

Explo-ration Needs

Second, in order to increase the depth of learning, an organization needs to increase the speed at
which it replicates its knowledge from one strategic context to another (Winter and Szulanski
2001). Moreover, the risk of failing to do so renders the organization vulnerable to higher
market risks. This unique combination of fast simultaneous exploitation and exploration for
hyper-learning is clarified further in Table 1 by contrasting it with more traditional forms of
learning.
Exploitation Needs
General and Superficial
Specific and Deep
Cell I: Low-level learning in a
Cell II: Incremental innovation
stable environment
through continued exploitation
Results in slow change and/or decay in
organizational capability and change;
Typical in natural monopolies and
bureaucracies

Results in focusing on exploitation in a
stable environment to achieve or sustain
dominant market position; Focus on
refining rigid core competencies;
Harnessing specialized capabilities in an
established area, e.g. oil drilling, or
software development for
telecommunications industry

Cell III: Exploration of
disruptive business opportunities

Cell IV: Hyper-learning

High level out-of box learning in a
dynamic turn-around environment;
Focus on technology and market
monitoring and assessment for
emerging markets to minimize business
risks; Typical in consulting and the
research industry

Broad and deep knowledge acquisition and
utilization with interlaced exploration and
exploitation cycles in turbulent and hypercompetitive environments; Focus on fast
learning as core competence; Typical in
high technology industries with rapid
technology changes and emerging markets

Table 1. Organizational Contingencies for Exploration and Exploitation Needs

As shown in Table 1, during hyper-learning (cell IV) the demand for exploration
increases drastically, while at the same time organizations must radically improve their
exploitation speed and how they shift between exploration and exploitation. Such a combination
is unique to hyper-competition and makes it different from the other organizational learning
contingencies that have shaped strategic thinking; in these situations, organizational learning is
seen as a slow dance of organizational focus over time, or through structure, between cells II and
III. In a stable environment, organizations try to prolong the period of exploitation of the
dominant design of the current generation technology as their core competence for as long as
possible (Leonard 1995, Prahalad and Hamel 1990), thereby focusing on cell II, until they face
technological and environmental uncertainties caused by the next generation of technology (cell
III) (Christensen 1997, Tushman and Anderson 1986). Therefore, stable environment
exploration (e.g., R&D and new venture) and exploitation (e.g., process improvements and best
practices) form distinct activities separated by time and structure. Instead, for organizations
pursuing hyper-learning (cell IV), exploitation and exploration form dialectics as two opposing
and separate facets of the same activity that builds up absorptive capacity over time . The core
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competency is the unique configuration and interlacing of these learning capabilities that allow
competition based on learning speed in terms of both depth and breadth.
There has been no prior research in the literature that specifically examines the distinctive
characteristics of hyper-learning and its outcomes. In order to begin to address this gap in the
literature, we conducted an exploratory multi-site case study in which we examined the
following questions: (a) what are the specific mechanisms of exploitation and exploration that
are used to radically increase the absorptive capacity (question 1); (b) how are these learning
mechanisms configured (question 2); and (c) how are the outcomes of hyper-learning reflected in
their organizational design and strategy execution? By answering these questions, we seek to
build a theory of hyper-learning.

Research Methods
We chose to conduct a multi-site case study (Yin 1994) to address these research
questions. The value of this type of study is that it allows for a replication logic by which we can
test emerging theoretical insights that permits us to triangulate both theory and data during the
research process (Eisenhardt 1989, Strauss and Corbin 1990). We conducted a 7-month field
study in seven software development firms that develop Web-based systems using emerging
Internet computing (March et al 2001). Here, “Web-based” systems refer to computing
applications that utilize Internet browsers, such as Netscape or Microsoft Internet Explorer, and a
set of open standards and protocols that include XML, HTML, http, URL, TCP/IP, combined
with the extensive use of middleware 1 architectures in leveraging the computing service.
We identified seven companies that met the following criteria: (1) they were developing
Web-based systems; (2) they were recognized by their peers as users of the most advanced
technologies available; and (3) they worked mostly for outside clients through contractual
relationships. Web-based systems development formed a key strategic technology direction of
these firms and they were active members of a technology community experimenting with Webbased technologies. They were constantly seeking to manage the uncertainty of their leadingedge technological solutions.
As the companies were developing software for external customers, they had to also
simultaneously assess, manage and share business and technology risks with their customers. As
a result, these companies were struggling with the challenges of identifying and managing the
knowledge assets of how to work with the “bleeding edge” technologies and demonstrate their
value in a business environment. We believe that this environment can be characterized as hypercompetition. A summary of the firms’ characteristics is included in Table 2. We explore in detail
the various learning mechanisms that these seven firms used to acquire, integrate, reconfigure
and purge knowledge assets at an unprecedented speed in order to cope with hyper-competition.
To minimize potential bias in our study, we sought to maximize the variations in our
sample. This also served the goal of improving the external validity of the study using the
replication logic by which the studied phenomena can be generalized into a theory of
organizational hyper-learning (Yin 1994). Companies had different sizes and operated in
different industry sectors in terms of the services provided (ranging from manufacturing,
1

In the computer industry, middleware is a general term for any programming that serves to "glue together" two
separate and usually already existing programs.
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financial services and public administration to retail and transportation). They had experience
using Web-based technologies in several application domains (back office, front office, and
inter-organizational applications). The geographical scope of their operations varied largely as
some were local software firms while others were part of large global companies. The firms also
had large variations in their software development experience, ranging from as few as four years
to 40+ years. We also included three firms from the U. S. and four from Finland in order to
minimize cultural or regional bias. Both countries are known to be leading exploiters of Internet
technologies.
The data was gathered primarily through semi-structured interviews with senior
management and by analyzing archives of the company documents, including systems
development documentations and technology strategies. We approached the companies and
requested access to their documents and senior executives and developers who made decisions
about technology investments and were in charge of strategy. The interviewees thus managed the
organizational knowledge bases and skills needed to execute a chosen technology and business
strategy. A range of three to six individuals from each company participated in the study. Each
interview lasted from one to three hours. The interviews reviewed the applications and solution
portfolios provided by these companies to their clients and examined how they delivered these
applications. We probed for changes taking place in the business and the technology domains of
their operations as a result of Internet computing. Specifically, we asked the firms to clarify the
extent, scope, depth and speed of changes in their software development when compared with
their situation prior to the Web development and to focus particularly on how their mechanisms
for learning had changed. We further examined how these firms coped with these changes and
how they had created dynamic capabilities.
All interviews took place between June and December 2000 and were tape recorded with
the permission of the firms. The interviews were transcribed and the summaries of these
transcripts were sent to the companies for correction and validation. Additional notes were made
during the visits concerning physical sites, personnel age, general atmosphere etc. We also
collected written materials from these companies, including their annual reports, Web sites,
advertising materials, manuals, and system handbooks. A summary of firms and their
characteristics is represented in Table 2.
Data analysis was done using the traditional inductive method (Boyatzis 1998, Glasser
and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1990). The transcript of each company was subject to a
within-case analysis that involved repeatedly reading the transcript and taking thorough notes
about firms’ perceptions of the competitive environments and their reactions to the
environmental changes and the need to create dynamic capabilities. After each individual case
had been analyzed, we began cross-case comparisons that involved listing the similarities and
differences among the firms we studied. The results of the cross-case comparisons provide a
vivid picture of the hyper-competitive environments that these firms were facing along with the
learning challenges. Furthermore, the results provide a consistent picture of how these firms
developed various learning mechanisms in order to simultaneously speed up exploitation and
exploration and how they configured them to radically increase their absorptive capacity. The
main findings are summarized in Table 3.
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Hyper-learning in Web-based Development Organizations
Web-based System Developments as a Hyper-Competitive Environment
The emergence of thin browsers such Mosaic, Netscape, or Internet Explorer, combined
with the introduction of Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) and Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (http)— a simple request-response protocol taking advantage of an open network—
fueled the development and diffusion of the Internet beyond its original purpose (Lyytinen et al.
1998, Tuomi 2002). While the initial implementation of the Internet dealt with the relatively
narrow technical challenges of packet switching, the success of this architecture in an open
network later on spiraled a wave of unforeseen computing solutions, tools and methods known as
Web-based computing. Consequently, the second half of 1990s witnessed wide and rapid
developments in all types of new tools, standards, protocols, and platforms for Web-based
computing. The innovations include standards for rendering multimedia (e.g., JPEG, MPEG,
Real Audio, Quick Time, etc), high-level protocols for data exchange, transfer and storage (e.g.,
XML, SSL, HP’s e-speak, EbXML, or Microsoft’s E-Biz etc.), scalable and reliable web servers
(e.g., Apache, Microsoft IIL, etc), new forms of middleware (e.g. BEA WebLogic, IBM
Websphere, Microsoft’s IIS), application servers (e.g., BEAs Weblogic, IBM Websphere,
Oracle’s PortaltoGo, Microsofts .NET ), and component-based software (e.g., .Net, Java Beans,
J2EE, etc). These innovations were triggered by and subsequently triggered new business
opportunities that had not previously existed (Basu and Kumar 2002, Sambamurthy and Zmud
2000, Straub and Watson 2001). New companies with radically innovative business models,
including eBay, Amazon.com, Priceline.com, and DoubleClick, emerged, an outcome that
necessitated high-level Web-based computing capacity. At the same time, traditional companies
embraced Web-based computing as an integral part of their on-going business activities.
Such developments created an unforeseen demand and competitive pressure on the
studied firms. Interview data made it clear that software development in these firms differed
greatly from the prior client/server and mainframe-centric computing. As one senior developer
said, “I know that the way that we build and integrate software is much different in this space
than what it used to be.” Specifically, these firms characterized development in the new
environment as having compressed technology lifecycles that resulted from intense and diverse
innovation in Internet computing, as indicated in new programming languages (Java, C#, J2EE),
development tools (.NET, Coldfusion, IIS etc), and data base systems (BEA WebLogic, Oracle
PortalToGo, IBM Websphere). They faced increased and different customer demand as observed
in completely separate applications (e.g. portals, front-stores, mobile applications) and in the
compressed time horizon in which they had to deliver them (from several months to several
weeks). At the same time, they observed unprecedented levels of intense competition created by
lavish access to venture capital, which responded to new market opportunities (as evidenced by
the emergence of new companies and competitors in the development market). Finally, they had
to develop new competencies and business models (i.e., content editing, communication skills,
partnerships, cost/profit sharing practices), which had traditionally not been part of their business
logic.
All firms felt that their ability to monitor, identify and assimilate new technologies was
critical to their survival in the business. These technologies dramatically shortened the life cycle
of a large portion of the skills and expertise they possessed. As a result, these firms needed
constantly explore and assimilate new technologies in order to stay ahead of the competition.
Such constant explorations resulted in an expansion of the breadth of capabilities necessary to
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compete successfully. Firms did not only need to acquire more knowledge, but new types of
knowledge that could not easily be understood within their cognitive frames.
In the past, firms had focused primarily on honing their skills in managing software
development processes as well as their associated technical competencies in capturing software
requirements and designing and implementing the system. Therefore, they all followed a
structured problem-solving approach in their software development activity. This was
documented in a set of roles and guidelines that stated what tasks had to be carried out, in which
sequence, with what outcomes, and by whom. Such guidelines established the backbone of
expected organizational responses to market competition. They stated how the organization
would execute its software delivery task and with what technological means in the market place.
Many times the guidelines had been audited and formally documented through such certification
processes as ISO 9000 (Peach 2002) or CMM Software capability model (Humphrey 1989) in
order to indicate the predictability and repetitiveness of an organization’s responses to their
clients. 2 These methodologies were detailed and implied a high level of detailed routinization
through the reliance upon stable and well-tried technological platforms. In short, these
organizations had been well equipped to effectively exploit their certainties in the past pertaining
to the characteristics of good software development (see also Pressman et al 1998).
As noted in Lyytinen et al (1998), however, Web-computing embraced a radically new
set of technological skills and other competencies that questioned many earlier capabilities and
views the companies had valued. Many companies were thus taken by surprise by the scope and
speed of change in these competencies. They had to rapidly expand their exploration of new
uncertainties, which included such diverse areas as telecommunications and component based
software development, (multi)-media oriented graphics, content and audio-visual representation,
process development practices that improved customers’ business processes around web-based
service delivery, and change management that initiated organizational change in their clients.
This rapid change of skill sets is echoed in the following quote:
“[For Web-based systems] it’s typically the [specialized] front-end developers who will do the
design. Or there will be a specific design person. If there’s a specific design person, that person
might know HTML, but it’s unlikely to know JAVA. If you have a developer, that person’s likely
to know JAVA, but not have the best design skills. And, obviously there is a disconnectivity
between those two because you want your web page to look good and run fast. And, it’s hard to
find resources that can do both. It’s not impossible, it’s just hard. Again, because developers tend
to be more logical. They are not focused on the artist approach to what a website should look like.
They need usually guidance.”

A significantly increased breadth of knowledge also brought to the fore the criticality of
meta-knowledge - how to reflect upon and organize these competencies within an organization,
how to build learning processes that provide solutions to burning questions, what to acquire,
what to keep, and what to throw away. Such meta-knowledge was related to the strategic thrusts
and drivers of these firms - in what technologies and markets would they be in and need to
compete. This change is reflected in the following quote by one business manager:

2

Three out of seven companies we studied had obtained such certificates in the past and they were regarded as
important signs of maturity and reliability in developing software solutions.
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“Our firm traditionally had extremely good knowledge sharing practices in place…[now we] have
just not been able to keep up with technology and the way that technology has been spreading
rapidly and diversifying into different subgroups.”

According to another manager:
“ (I) don't have enough people yet to say that we have very good expertise on every technology
we employ.”

While these firms were rapidly expanding the breadth of capabilities, they simultaneously
had to exploit the newly acquired skills. To assimilate these knowledge assets faster, they
needed to expedite the experimental processes. For example, in firm 1, the team-leader would
recognize when the team was deficient in a new skill and would task his subordinates with
learning the particular skill through their own research and study and then implement the new
knowledge as soon as possible.
“Well I mean, it’s more of a mentor thing, where [my subordinates say], ‘well you know I’m
getting blown up on this,’ and I’ll go and look at what they’re doing and [say] you really need to
go read up on this and here’s a book...[and these reading assignments are the equivalent of]
tutoring on demand.”

Furthermore, the firms had to apply the assets in a wider scope in order to better
understand technology potential. This occurred in part by learning from others and in part by
learning from personal experience. The firms also had to internally transfer the knowledge faster
so that problems amenable to Web computing could be formulated and solved effectively. The
rapid expansion of depth helped them to see what was truly novel in technologies and what could
be reused from their prior competency bases.
Similarly, according to one of the managers at Firm 7, they saw themselves as having two
types of projects - one for exploiting the technology skills they had managed to disseminate
throughout their development group and another, which was risky, but allowed for the fast
exploration of new skill sets while simultaneously exploiting them.
“[We] have like two types of projects. Those that [utilize our well understood technologies, and
those that] introduce new technologies in some kinds areas. And those latter ones are highly
exposed [i.e., risky], and for those you use your [specialized] skilled resources. [That group] is
the type of talent who are very good people in these technologies and you allocate these people to
those highly exposed projects”

In addition to the rapid expansion of the breadth and depth of knowledge, the companies
experienced a rapid contraction of time horizon. This was a result of two factors. First, the fast
developments in technology placed pressure on these companies to accelerate their learning
processes. This primarily affected the speed and scope of their exploration. Second, their clients
demanded a radically faster delivery of solutions, which deeply affected their exploitation speeds
and capabilities. Companies sensed a great urgency among their clients to “get the damn system
out” and to become the first to market. The applications had to be turned out at “Internet speed”
and firms had to set up dramatically shortened project targets. This happened at the same time
when the amount of knowledge that needed to be assimilated increased. In fact, firms’ efforts to
expand the breadth of capabilities were caused in part by the dramatic compression of
development timeframes and the shortened life expectancy of technical knowledge. Firms were
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less sure how long they would require specific capabilities and how critical they would be in the
future. In order to deal with these uncertainties, the firms had to become more selective and
conscious about what to keep and what to give up and quickly comprehend the potential value of
a new capability before extensive exploitation occurred.
Collectively, our data reveals that rapid technological change, increased pressure from
clients and high uncertainty and ambiguity of markets resulted in hyper-learning. Firms had to
continuously juggle the processes of exploration and exploitation in order to stay at the forefront
of the wave of innovation.
Rapid Expansion of the Breadth of Knowledge
How do companies rapidly acquire new capabilities? Our data reveal a remarkably
consistent pattern by which the firms we studied rapidly acquired new capabilities. While each
firm had a slight variation in its capacity building, all firms followed the mechanisms of (a)
distributed and active gate-keeping and (b) extended grafting of external knowledge in order to
rapidly acquire new capabilities.
Distributed and Active Gate-Keeping. In the new situation, companies closely heeded the
changing environment and allocated a large proportion of their resources to boundary spanning
and environmental monitoring activities. One prevalent mechanism was the active use of gatekeepers that scanned their environment and translated technical and business information into a
form that was comprehensible to the rest of the organization and its agenda (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990). Such a gate-keeping function took several forms, but all of the firms moved this
activity in the front line where the strategy was executed. It was also distributed and
decentralized across a larger number (up to 80% of the organizations’ members) of
organizations’ members than the traditional form of gate-keeping, which typically is limited to a
small number of people in the organization.
For example, the strategy of Firm 1 was primarily driven by the capabilities of lead
developers who were attracted to the company’s technology jobs. Therefore, the firm sold only
what the developers wanted to produce and exploit, based on their exploration. For example, one
executive said:
“We use J2EE because it is considered to be the attractive technology by the elites in the
development community. Those are the type of people we like to hire. So, if we tried to give less
attractive technology jobs to those people, the developers would quit… We hire good people and
good people want good technologies. And, we go with the technologies we go with because that is
where people want to go.”

By having at least one person in the organization keep up with each of the newest
technologies, the organization was able to place this person in the role of lead mentor in the
development group to disseminate knowledge quickly once the technology needed to be
exploited:
“Typically, if you go into a new project and there’s new technology, [we make sure to already
have] a few people who have [familiarized themselves with that technology] before. [That way
we] won’t have everybody who’s not done it. The people who have done it would review the code
or the work products of people who haven’t and then show them what they’re doing wrong.”
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The firm invested heavily in off-site training for these developers in order to enable them
to acquire new skill sets. Once they acquired these skills, they became the main drivers of the
firm’s future services.
Firm 2, a large global management and technology consulting firm, relied heavily on
external sources such as open-source communities and Internet newsgroups as means of
acquiring new knowledge. An executive of the firm observed that, “geeks in newsgroups have
the best information and we try to piggyback on them.” The firm encouraged all employees to
participate in the newsgroups, but in most cases this activity relied on a cadre of “technology
gurus” who were deeply enmeshed in the fabric of those newsgroups and could explore and
understand new technological solutions. The reason for this was the depth and fast pace of
change in knowledge and its contextual nature, which required high level expertise and social
networks to truly grasp it.
Firm 3 had been spun off from its parent company, which focused on “traditional”
mainframe based services. It was spun off “because of the recognition that decisions could not
be made fast enough in the parent corporation moving at the large company pace to meet the
requirements of the Internet pace.” It originally started with 22 people, but quickly tripled in
size. Since the core members of the firm came from the distributed network group, the firm had
to quickly acquire new skills for the Web-based developments outlined above (media skills,
business change skills, and component development based skills). To fill this gap, the firm hired
a new chief information officer (CIO), who had substantial experience in Web-based
development, to infuse these developments skills to the rest of the firm and accordingly establish
the gate-keeping capability.
Firm 4 and Firm 5— both start-ups— focused exclusively on Web systems development
and had similar structures due to a lack of organizational inertia and earlier cognitive framing.
These were optimally matched with their local learning needs and strategy execution. Both of
them identified a small group of “experts” in specified areas and relied heavily on them to
identify and assimilate new capabilities. Firm 4 had “Skill Leaders,” in eight different areas who
were responsible for “scanning environment of external technologists, the press, and
newsgroups.” Similarly, Firm 5 maintained a list of employees who were identified as “experts.”
They amounted to about 10% of the employees. In addition, the Human Resource department
kept the list of employees who were interested in learning new technologies. About 25-30% of
employees fell into this group. The firm sent those people for training and tried to elevate them
into experts. Sometimes, they also recruited people to bring new technological capabilities into
the company. For each key technology, the firm expected to have at least one to three experts.
These experts had to share what they had learned from scanning the external environment and
through the technology trials with the rest of the firm. Within the company, everyone knew who
those experts were, and sought their help in addressing their technical problems.
Firm 6, a consulting branch of a global computer hardware, software, and service
provider used “boundary scanners,” who worked closely with the firm’s business partners. Each
of them was an expert in a set of selected technology areas. Typically, the firm negotiated with
their clients to run experiments in emerging technologies, such as mobile commerce and wireless
services. These projects involved a higher degree of risk and the firm sometimes agreed to take
on the project with lower profit margins. Since the firm’s employees did not have all the
necessary capabilities and skills, it sought out the expertise of its business partners. The business
partners kept the firm informed of what they had learned in these projects so that the firm could
offer proven solutions later to its clients through their expert network. The firm also utilized a
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large global knowledge management system that was dedicated to collecting data on solutions
that had been offered by boundary scanning business partners.
Finally, Firm 7, a large Finnish information technology service firm, ran a separate
technical support group for its frontline consultants. At the highest level of technical support, the
firm had “mentors” who comprised about 1% of all employees. These mentors were experts in
chosen technical areas. They were assigned to key pilot projects when a new technology or
strategy was being developed and deployed for the first time. Typically, a mentor stayed with the
project about three months before he or she moved on to the next project. Mentors were also
expected to bring frameworks, methods, and guidelines to the rest of the organization from their
fields of expertise.
In summary, all firms had active and explicit structures and processes of gate-keeping for
identifying, monitoring and acquiring new capabilities. These individuals were highly regarded
in the firms for their technical skills and domain expertise and were actively recognized and
supported by senior management. Many times these gate-keepers were deeply immersed in the
Internet communities, hardware and software vendor communities, and academic research
communities where they constantly sought out new opportunities and threats. Many firms
strategically selected their projects in order to acquire new capabilities and placed gate-keepers
in those projects. Thus, active, distributed and decentralized gate-keeping seem to be a unique
feature of organizational hyper-learning; the gate-keepers provide strategic access points in the
“front line” to critical knowledge and competencies and thereby become the nexus of expanding
the breadth of competencies and speeding up their exploitation.
Extended Grafting of External Knowledge. As a result of diminishing timelines and the
introduction of several new technologies, the firms had to import a significant amount of
knowledge from external sources by directly acquiring software components, through
outsourcing or strategic partnerships. Extended grafting resulted in the rapid acquisition of
capabilities in the form of tangible resources or codified knowledge that could be easily disposed
of when no longer needed. This strategy was followed primarily when there was no time to
develop competencies internally, when these competencies did not fit with the strategic
management “vision,” or when the external sourcing exposed them to a low power position due
to resource dependencies. Sometimes extended grafting was driven by the need to keep an
organization’s identity and its cognitive models simple and uniform. For example, older software
companies resisted the idea of hiring graphics designers and instead outsourced graphical
designs. Grafting was a radical change for these firms and was adopted out of necessity to deal
with the demands of Internet computing. As one manager indicated, “moving towards assembly,
it just happened overnight.”
Because of these changes in building applications, firm 1 found that they now sought to
purchase software components from external sources whenever they were available. At the same
time, it no longer actively built its internal software libraries. This was a significant change from
the past because the firm used to develop most of the software internally and draw upon its
internal software assets. Although the increased technological capabilities of component based
software 3 certainly contributed to this change, the compressed development time was an
3

This is echoed in the idea of being able to “plug in” software components like Lego blocks into different parts of
the software “architecture” by concealing the differences in the runtime platforms and interfaces through
middleware “glue” like Object Request Brokers (Corba), or Distributed objects (DCOMM), see
(http://www.omg.org/news/whitepapers/).
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important contributing factor for this change. An executive of Firm 1 stated the following:
“We always take the fast way out. We have often been able to buy and plug in a component faster
than we would have been able to just spec out the requirements alone, let alone build quality
assurance.”

Further, he believed that they were going to have to drastically increase component buying from
the currently high levels as the way to deal with increasingly shorter timelines. As he indicated,
“You know we have to move in that direction in order to be able to respond faster.”
Firm 2 imported external knowledge in the form of software components as well. It
relied heavily on open-source communities that were monitored through their gate-keepers to
check the new entries or changes in the community directories. The firm also outsourced
software development to external contractors to bring in “developers” whose skill sets the firm
did not internally possess. Firm 3 also experienced a significant increase in outsourcing. It
extensively used external Java programmers after it hired its CIO to acquire the skills utilized in
Web-based systems development.
Firm 4 actively utilized both outsourcing and components as a way to expand the breadth
of its knowledge. One executive of the firm said the following:
“Customers often have many parts of the project that we don’t give to them. We outsource [web
site] hosting and ASP [application service provider]. We purchase the platform and buy
components. We purchase components because we don’t have enough resources. We don’t “do
Web sites” and we will act as project manager for the existing clients to find a small company to
do it.”

This firm chose Finland as its location as it enabled outsourcing for the following reasons: (a) the
firm was rapidly expanding its knowledge resources in the mobile computing area (b) Finland
was a convenient area for recruiting people with mobile computing knowledge; and (c) Finland
had a deep pool of local resources.
Firm 5 was least active in grafting external knowledge. Still, its executives admitted that
they tried to buy components when good ones were available. Along the same vein, the firm used
outsourcing infrequently. Sometimes, when a customer wanted them to develop systems with the
newest technologies, the firm some worked with external contractors to bring in such
technologies.
Firm 6 actively used outsourcing when clients required special customized developments.
In particular, the firm extensively outsourced graphic and telecommunication designs - especially
in its growing mobile business. The firm also extensively purchased components when required.
Finally, Firm 7 outsourced the areas in which they neither had strong capabilities nor saw any
reason to expand them. Those areas included testing, graphics design, and training. In addition,
the firm sought to acquire other companies that possessed key strategic skills that would be
useful in their future businesses, including mobile services, enterprise integration platforms and
so on.
In summary, except for Firm 5, all other firms used outsourcing and strategic alliances to
rapidly acquire new capabilities. Many firms purchased software components when they did not
have time, or when they did not see the need to develop deep expertise in that area. On the
whole, firms struggled to find a balanced and “strategic” way to graft external knowledge.
Outsourcing, strategic alliances, and component purchasing were pursued mostly to gain access
to capabilities where their expected lifespan was seen as short and insignificant to their core
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strategy.
Ironically, at the same time, the firms relied less on internal documentation and the reuse
of their software assets. This was due to the rapid expansion of technology domains, such as
multimedia and communications. Another factor was the fast rate of diffusion of Web solutions
to different industries. As a result, companies worked with many disparate industries, which
reduced the portability of functional code. Some of their clients also required that the delivered
code should not be reused. The rapid exploration cycles caused also constant information
overload making the reuse of code less effective. For example, Firm 5 had set up internal
libraries for software reuse, but these were not effectively used. There were too many and
diverse software components stored, which over time made it confusing, uncertain and
dangerous to use the components.
Rapid Expansion of the Depth of Knowledge
How do companies in hyper-competitive environments exploit the ambiguous and
uncertain knowledge that they have acquired and transform it into a certainty? How do they
deepen the knowledge and yet manage to keep abreast of rapidly changing environment? Our
data provides several insights into how companies accomplished this without losing their ability
to further expand their knowledge bases. Again, we observed the following two mechanisms
that increased rapid exploitation: (a) the reuse of simple rules and artifacts, and (b) the building
of peer networks.
Reuse of Simple Rules and Design Artifacts. As noted earlier, firms relied extensively on
external knowledge sources instead of reusing of their internal code assets in order to free
cognitive capabilities to acquire new capabilities. At the same time, to enable the rapid
exploitation of their codified knowledge, they pursued a new sort of artifact-based exploitation.
Contrary to the past when the reuse of the code was internally developed, the companies were
increasingly reusing higher-level system knowledge that pertained to the development processes
and design patterns – a reuse which yields higher productivity gains, but requires a higher
abstraction of task domains (Zhang and Lyytinen 2001).
Firm 1 retained the effective development patterns from their previous projects. These
covered both the processes and design patterns that offered boilerplates for solutions. In
particular, they reused templates for web pages they had developed. This resulted in a
methodology that was dramatically simpler and favored the use of prototypical design solutions.
The reason for this change was that the older detailed methodology did not work. One of the
interviewees said the following:
“I did out of sheer panic. I spent two days [at a customer site] trying to get [deliverables from
using the old methodology] that worked and failed miserably. It was embarrassing” (Architect,
Firm 1).

In Firm 2, patterns and processes were also highly reused. Design patterns were made
available in manuals that were shared over the Internet. Many of the analysis patterns were
developed in the headquarters and the emphasis was on the significant reuse of patterns. This
was a significant departure from the firm’s past practice that emphasized code reuse.
Furthermore, the executive of the firm said that accelerated changes in technology forced them to
loosen up their rigid development methodology, as detailed guidelines did not work. Again, this
was a significant departure from their past practice where the firm was known to take huge pride
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in having a well-established development methodology.
At Firm 3, the goal was to simplify their methodology and reuse mostly functional
business logics behind the system design. According to one executive,
“These products [web-based systems] were developed without a formalized set of methodologies.
Current versions of software did not develop at the Internet speed. Some took 18 to 24 months,
which we don’t consider acceptable. We have been “winging it” using some very basic
methodology rules and tools to make a quality product.”

Although the firm had a well formulated system development methodology it had
inherited from the parent company, the developers argued that it did not fit with the new
environment. Consequently, the firm had adopted a simple and informal 3-step method.
Similarly, Firm 4 had developed a simple 3-step methodology that consisted of the “envision,”
“shape,” and “realize” phases. The methodology enabled the firm to reuse the development
patterns without reusing the code over a variety of technological platforms and business
environments.
Developers at Firm 5 mentioned that they did not reuse the code, but reused their simple
methodology. Their methodology was also simpler than the traditional software engineering
methodologies to which they were accustomed. They believed that traditional methodologies
would be too “heavy” for the size and speed of typical Web development. Firm 6 was similar to
Firm 2 in terms of its global scale of operations as well as its heavy reliance on an established
methodology. Like other firms we studied, Firm 6 had adopted an informal methodology for its
Web systems, which reused analysis patterns. While they reused their analysis and overall
solution designs, they integrated them with outsourcing and external component purchasing
practices during system implementation.
Finally, among the firms we studied, Firm 7 most aggressively pursued code reuse and
highly standardized development processes. However, an executive acknowledged that following
their strict development processes was difficult and the firm had to focus on “bare essentials.” As
a result, it was stripping off less essential aspects of the methodology.
Overall, it is striking to note that all firms were moving away from rigid, detailed and
standardized development methodologies that had been the pride of these companies over the
last ten years. At the same time, they used design artifacts and simple patterns as a means of
exploiting their knowledge assets. This resulted in radically simplified and informal development
methodologies, which represented a sharp departure from the prevailing tradition within the
software industry of reusing code and adhering to detailed (routinized) methodologies in order to
successfully manage software development. Moreover, some firms had extensively used CASE
(computer aided software engineering) tools to automate steps of their formalized development
process. Not surprisingly, those tools were not used any more. This “un-bundling” was
necessary since their methodologies did not fit with the changing environments where speed and
change was everything. Most technical experts and executives attributed the shift to simple
artifact-based reuse and patterns to rapidly expanding business and technological uncertainty.
The new technological landscape made software reuse less appealing: software vendors
introduced tools that were not compatible with their existing code. Rapidly expanding business
environments made software reuse less attractive, since client requirements varied dramatically
across different industries. Furthermore, the shortened development times placed a tremendous
amount of pressure on the timely completion of projects whereby the reusability of software code
became a less important goal.
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Building Peer Expert Networks. The firms relied on peer networks, in order to effectively
exploit their low-level detailed technical knowledge necessary to implementing the systems. All
firms used mentoring mechanisms and peer networks to share and maintain technical knowledge.
In most cases, gatekeepers became the critical nexus of mentoring processes and thus acted as
the key integration mechanism in interlacing the exploration with exploitation. For example, in
Firm 1, the top management tried to “spread the knowledge around by placing the people with
appropriate skills sets to mentor available people who are assigned to a project.” They also
reviewed the software code written by others in order to share new knowledge and transfer good
coding practices.
Firm 2 used to rely extensively on formal training. Traditionally they had relied on an
elaborate system development methodology in which all new employees received
“indoctrination” training that lasted for three weeks. Additional CDs, technical manuals,
technical databases, and satellite video facilitated knowledge sharing around the methodology
and designs. However, the firm soon realized the shortcomings of their rigid knowledge transfer
mechanisms. Accordingly, it started informal on-the-job mentoring in relation to Web system
development and relied on gatekeepers to provide technical expertise in their specific areas.
According to an executive of the firm, about 75% of people ask the gatekeepers for existing
solutions during design tasks in order to minimize duplicate efforts. Most often, these
gatekeepers were contacted via e-mail.
At the time of the study, Firm 3 was planning to implement a mentoring program under
the leadership of a new CIO. The firm planned explicitly to tie their employees’ promotions and
salary increases to their mentoring activities. Firm 4 actively used mentoring as a means of
sharing knowledge. The firm often hired people without adequate technical background as long
as they had a minimum amount of technical knowledge and were willing to learn on their own.
Most training was done during the projects through mentoring and each new employee was
assigned to a mentor. (S)he also had access to regional training programs where they met other
people and could exchange technical and tool knowledge and solution guidelines.
Firm 5 used “unofficial” experts to share and deepen its knowledge base during
exploitation while simultaneously promoting experts to exploit acquired technical knowledge at
a detailed level. The projects of the firm had a “flat” structure, which was expected to encourage
people to take ownership of their own areas. As noted earlier, the firm expanded its knowledge
base mostly by relying on experts who had to deepen their knowledge voluntarily and through
new hired employees. In either case, the employees who had expertise were expected to share
their knowledge with others through mentoring.
Firm 6 had a firm-wide training program for new hires. It began with a conference that
was designed to educate people before they joined the team. Each new-hire was then brought
under the tutelage of “on-boarding personnel development managers” who acted as mentors for
three months. After this period, new team members were released into the real team environment
to work on real projects. Once they were assigned to these projects, the firm assigned a local
mentor to each new-hire for 2-4 years. Each mentor, in turn, had 5-10 local apprentices.
Apprentice development became part of the evaluation of the mentors’ performance.
Finally, Firm 7 also actively used a mentoring mechanism for sharing knowledge. Once
the exploration group understood a technology or skill set, this firm would then transfer its
knowledge into a knowledge base. This was a codified, three-stage process where a select group
of “mentors” or knowledge explorers (there were approximately ten in a development group of
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1000) first gather and then transfer knowledge to a select group of support personnel
(approximately twenty people). The support personnel would then take this transferred
knowledge, enter it into a knowledge base and act as support staff for the general group at large
(the remaining 950 people):
“Mentors guide the support groups, and the support group, which can provide the FAQ [frequently
asked questions] acts as an answering service and [provides] help for the [subsequent] projects”

These mentors were put in a project long enough to transfer their expertise to one key person in
that project. These people later became mentors themselves after obtaining adequate technical
depth. According to one executive of the firm,
“Projects where mentors were assigned were typically those where some new technology or
strategy was being developed and deployed for the first time in the company. Once the lessons
were learned from the pilot project, the knowledge was transferred to the rest of the technical
support organization from the mentors so that future groups working in this area would not need
mentors.”

In summary, our data reveal how firms were increasingly moving away from traditional,
formal, and extensive training methods that relied on codified knowledge and standardized
evaluation methods. This became particularly evident among established and large companies
like Firms 2, 6, and 7. These firms had used these formal training programs to “indoctrinate”
their employees into their routine software development approach. When the companies
recognized their limitations, they started to increasingly rely on simple rules and design artifacts
that acted as “boundary objects” for development teams and began to offer flexible and efficient
structuring and solution mechanisms. These “boilerplates” could later be filled with increasingly
varying and complex technical detail through mentoring and expert based reviews. When
determining how to integrate and embed these highly complex and volatile technologies into
evolving designs, they thus established social networks of mentors and apprentices. Many times,
peer networks were integrated with organizational memory approaches like Q&A or FAQ
databases where people could search for and discover existing mentoring knowledge that was
partly codified through conversations or shared opinions in the network. Such knowledge often
expanded to Internet news groups or to external peer networks in the community.
These organic knowledge-sharing networks offered several advantages. First, new
capabilities could be rapidly shared with selected small groups. Unlike traditional training
programs, in which it takes months to prepare the training materials, mentors could quickly share
what they know with groups of people when the technical context was adequately established.
This knowledge could also be audited and modified through the use of collaborative and
distributed technologies. When the companies shifted toward the use of increasingly simple rules
and artifacts as coordinating mechanisms for development, peer networks offered a
complementary mechanism to share and maintain detailed technical knowledge that had been
bundled together with the routines (methodologies) in the past. Mentoring processes were thus
critical and necessary to rapidly sharing uncertain and detailed technical knowledge. As a result,
the detailed technical knowledge became unbundled from the methodical routines of the
organization and instead became the property of the socio-technical networks and the smart
people engaged in them.
The second advantage of mentoring was its flexibility. Unlike traditional software
engineering knowledge transfer mechanisms where everything is embedded in a rigid
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methodology or a CASE tool in order to ensure the consistency and predictability of the
development processes, peer networks provided increased flexibility as to when, how and to
what extent the knowledge was shared. This was valuable when organizations faced a high
uncertainty of how lasting the knowledge was. Through peer networks, gatekeepers could
quickly and adequately learn new technologies and share their knowledge with others.
Finally, to pursue fast exploitations through the peer expert network, these firms sought
to hire smart people and create the “aura” of an intelligent organization through hiring policies
and incentives. In many cases, it was more important to find a person who was excellent at
acquiring new knowledge than it was to find someone with a specific skill set. As a result, some
of the most valued technologists in firm 5 came from a variety of backgrounds. The manager
noted the following:
“Probably something more about the experts is that I think that we have more diversity in the
backgrounds of our people…we have one biologist, one teacher, actually two teachers, one
librarian, we used to have one journalist but he left, so they are not all just, you know, coders.”

Also, an executive at Firm 1 commented that the firm intentionally hired people who could thrive
in this environment:
“We hire really good people… we believe that for something like language they can pick it up
themselves and get some mentoring. Now, if there was something really drastic, then we will
probably send them for training. Most cases they can pick it up themselves. We can pick up
things fairly easily.”

Incentives for these experts included making their job interesting, not simply offering
them more money. As the owner of firm 5 said, “Money is not the issue. I know from the
experience that we've had, that's not everything.” Specifically, his employees had turned down
more money elsewhere because, “the stuff they're doing is so boring, [they were] not interested.”
In addition, the gifted and valuable learners or “experts” were allowed to choose their own career
path in an effort to keep them interested in staying with the company: “[The positions they end up
with] depends on what they wish for. We try to take their wishes into account because all we have
is what they have between their ears, actually.”
Through smart people, the grafted components become a key ingredient of hyperlearning. “Smart” people picked up these components and “filled” them into simplified
development patterns. These simple design patterns that acted as cognitive platforms for agile
development and rapid sense-making had to be complemented both with external codified
knowledge and rapidly configured local knowledge through peer networks, both of which
depend on smart activities. Therefore companies tried to graft large amounts of knowledge from
external sources, at some points exceeding the knowledge of the experts in most other firms and
the world community. Some of these gatekeepers found that they were among the first in the
environment to be searching for answers to specific questions. As the gatekeeper in firm 4 said,
“I have found usually nobody [in his external network including Internet bulletin boards and
throughout the international 10,000 employee network] knows answers to my questions, so that
makes it pretty hard to ask those questions. So I learn to find the [knowledge] on my own.”
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Discussion
During hyper-competition, organizations gain, integrate, reconfigure, and release
capabilities to cope with unpredictable and swift changes in competition. This is accomplished
by transforming their learning activities in a manner that is consistent with hyper-learning. We
began this paper with three research questions. Our exploratory study provides answers to these
questions. Our first research question deals with the specific learning mechanisms that
organizations use for exploitation and exploration in order to rapidly increase the absorptive
capacity. Our second research questions addresses how organizations configured these four
learning mechanisms as an element of their dynamic capabilities. Finally, our third research
question is to identify the outcomes of hyper-learning as reflected in organizational design and
strategy executions. Below we will discuss our findings in light of these three questions.
Questions 1: Learning Mechanisms for Hyper-Learning
What were the specific learning mechanisms by which organizations rapidly increased
their absorptive capacity? We identified two specific mechanisms— active and strategic gatekeeping and extended grafting of external knowledge— that were instrumental in fostering rapid
exploration. Likewise, we identified the reuse of simple rules and design artifacts and the
building of peer networks as two primary mechanisms that quickened exploitation. In both areas,
organizations invented behaviors and processes that significantly departed from their established
responses to learning needs.
Question 2: Configuration of Hyper-Learning Mechanisms
All firms simultaneously engaged in exploration and exploitation. Therefore, they moved
their technological and business expertise to the front line through the decentralized and
distributed organization of gatekeepers. This increased their demand for people who could think
out of the box–those they called “smart.” At the same time, these gatekeepers became the nexus
of fast exploitation through their position in peer networks. Another mechanism that enabled fast
exploration was extensive grafting through codified external knowledge and skill sourcing. This
freed additional cognitive resources for identifying and monitoring rapid movements in the
environment. A shift towards using simple rules and artifact-based exploitation enabled
vicarious learning through trials and the consecutive refinement of cognitive frames that enabled
fast exploitation. When combined with informal knowledge transfer in peer networks, this
resulted in the more frictionless and agile mobilization of cognitive resources.
The simultaneous engagement in both facets of learning had temporal and structural
implications. Temporally, firms did not follow the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model of learning
(Tushman and Anderson 1986). Instead, they had to explore new technologies and at the same
time find ways of applying them on the fly. In line with this, firms did not create structurally
separate units dedicated to either exploration or exploitation, but rather expanded their
competencies in the front line by making it smarter to explore the hyper-competitive
environment and move competencies around. In most of the studied cases, nearly the entire
organization was dedicated to both exploration and exploitation.
Another important characteristic of hyper-learning mechanisms was the reciprocal—or
systemic—interlacing of exploration and exploitation. Hyper-learning organizations not only
evenly pursue exploitation and exploration, but had to deeply embed these in their social fabric.
Exploration and exploitation therefore become dialectical moments in the rapid movement of
technological and business innovation where gatekeepers share, create and maintain knowledge
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to make it a certainty within months instead of years. Much of this movement is tacit in the sense
that all the necessary technical knowledge cannot be foreseen and is not available through
traditional knowledge sharing practices including training, documentation of procedures etc.
Question 3: Outcomes of Hyper-Learning
Another important novel characteristic of hyper-learning are its outcomes. The resourcebased theory of the firm suggests that firms exploit the learning outcomes primarily in order to
gain sustainable competitive advantage; they therefore need to routinize the new capabilities and
skills so that they can be easily be replicated through the continued refinement of core
competencies (Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter 1995, Winter and Szulanski 2001, Winter and
Szulanski 2002). Therefore, firms bundle key resources with other resources to minimize
imitation by competitors (Dierickx and Cool 1989, Lippleman and Rumelt 1982, Teece 1987).
Our analysis of hyper-learning firms challenges this wisdom. We instead found that firms
radically simplified their rules to enable fast movements between different competency bases
since this was the only way possible to keep up with the pace of innovation. Consequently, some
of the studied firms had to abandon their previously established software development
methodologies, which had been bundled into their CASE tools in order to replicate and refine
their core capabilities in a larger scale, while impeding competitor imitation. Earlier, this
bundling had been treated as an important source of competitive advantage and a core
competency. However, none of the firms were pursuing such a strategy in the new situation they
faced, but instead had largely unbundled their knowledge resources and capabilities.
To un-bundle resources, firms had to deploy simplified rules and design patterns. Such
patterns represented additional high-level meta-knowledge that could correspond with the
explosive growth of low-level detailed knowledge, which occurred as they explored new
capabilities and tested different competency bases. Such low-level local knowledge was
assimilated either in the form of tacit knowledge, through socialization such as mentoring
(Nonaka 1994) whereby it remained tacit, or integrated into the socio-technical network in the
form of loosely organized artifacts including e-mail, short memos, or quick and dirty solution
frames which could be quickly discarded when their value degraded. Our results are consistent
with earlier work that found that organizational routines in high-velocity environments tend be
simple, experiential, and semi-structured (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).
Toward a Theory of Hyper-Learning
When taken together, our results suggest a novel systemic configuration of hyperlearning organizations, as displayed in Figure 2. As shown in the figure, critical to hyperlearning is how and when organizations integrate specific capabilities into their repertoire and
how they learn to quickly exploit them. The left side of the model shows rapid exploration that
responds to the multiple learning stimuli for breadth, while its right side responds to the learning
needs for the rapid and scalable exploitation and increasing depth.
A key element in the model is the dynamic interlacing of exploration and exploitation
processes that removes the temporal and structural gaps between the two (as denoted by the two
arrows that connect them). Hence, in hyper-learning systems, organizations not only mobilize
particular learning mechanisms in order to separately shift both exploration and exploitation into
“high gear,” but they also have to accelerate cycles between exploration and exploitation through
the tight coupling between them that results in ambidextrous learning. In this model, the
dynamic capability of a firm in hyper-competitive environments comes from the firm’s core
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competency of accelerating cycles between exploration and exploitation as well as how
effectively the four specific learning mechanisms are integrated, as shown by the dependencies
in Figure 2.

Exploitation
Enable effective use
Active
Grafting

Multiple
learning
stimuli for
breadth

Simple
Patterns

Focus and increase
flexibility of
learning needs

Enables fast
knowledge
transfer and learning

Distributed
Gatekeeping

Focus and increase
flexibility of
knowledge transfer

Multiple
learning
stimuli for
depth

Peer
networks
Increase speed and
flexibility of
exploitation

Exploration

Smart people

Figure 2. Hyper-Learning System

When new learning stimuli arise, hyper-learning firms need to swiftly decide whether
they require a new capability or whether it needs to deepen its existing sets of expertise. If it
observes a need for the new set of capabilities, then the firm needs to make swift decisions as to
whether it will rely on their gatekeepers to explore new capabilities further, or whether it can
import them from external sources. The outcome of exploration is made available to the rest of
the organization through radically simplified routines and a tight peer expert network. This has
significant implications for the processes that follow and how the organization will continually
configure its resources. The resultant tacking around dynamic capability resembles the finessed
dance of decisions observed in high velocity environments (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995).
In hyper-learning systems, specific learning mechanisms for exploitation and exploration
do not exist on their own. Rather, they exist as components of the duality that plays out the
dialectics of hyper-learning. For example, active grafting and distributed gate-keeping cannot be
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effective learning mechanisms for rapid exploration unless they shape and are shaped by simple
patterns and peer networks for rapid exploitation. Likewise, the effectiveness of the rapid
exploitations depends on the success of rapid explorations.
The hyper-learning system, as depicted above, is a dramatic departure from traditional
organizational learning models both temporally and structurally. In traditional learning models,
exploration functions (R&D and market research) are largely centralized in order to optimize the
accuracy and scale of knowledge transfer from exploration to exploitation. On the other hand,
the exploitation function is streamlined for long term and incremental learning in order to
support formalized knowledge transfer mechanisms. The logic of the system is largely dictated
by the need to find a balanced allocation between exploration and exploitation over time (March
1991). Thus, incremental learning and exploitation of current technology is prolonged until
executives of the company realize the changes in technology and/or environments and make
decisions to focus more on explorations. From the knowledge management perspective,
traditional organization units involved explorations that focus primarily on knowledge creation,
while others focus on knowledge re-use and transfer. To the contrary, knowledge is constantly
created and re-created through the dialectic interlacing of explorations and exploitations in
hyper-learning systems.
The shift from a traditional learning system based on punctuated equilibrium to a hyperlearning system based on hyper-competition is thus a disruptive organizational transformation
that requires cognitive, behavioral and structural changes. In this sense, one element of the
dynamic capability is the organization’s capability to transform itself from a traditional learning
system to the one depicted in Figure 2 -- a kind of dynamic meta-capability.

Conclusion
Our study contributes to the growing stream of research on dynamic capability as a
strategic asset during hyper-competition. We explored in depth how organizations became
ambidextrous in the simultaneous exploration and exploitation of new capabilities. We painted a
picture of organizational learning that is radically different from the dominating models of
organizational learning that lean on a punctuated model of strategic capability development,
which recognizes distinct and separate exploitation and exploration phases. Our study
complements and challenges many of the assumptions in the existing body of the literature in
organizational learning. Within the organizational learning literature, our study contributes to
the growing body of knowledge about dynamic capability. In particular, it provides important
insights into how organizations quickly develop new capabilities. This is linked to their ability
to reduce the increasing gap between exploration and exploitation both in time and structure,
which is achieved through their systemic interlacing. Furthermore, we found that micro-level
behaviors related to exploration and exploitation exhibit unique characteristics. This finding
offers further support to the viewpoint that dynamic capabilities are not vague or tautological
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). We can expect that there are also other mechanisms by which
firms hyper-learn and different ways by which they reduce the gap between exploration and
exploitation. Therefore, future research on dynamic capabilities needs to focus on specific
micro-level learning behaviors as well as on organizational mechanisms and technologies that
connect learning processes in order to accelerate the innovation.
For the knowledge management literature, our study challenges the prevalent dichotomy
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of knowledge creation and knowledge reuse. While some scholars in this area have emphasized
knowledge creation (Leonard-Barton 1995, Nonaka 1991, Nonaka and Konno 1998), many
others focused on the reuse and transfer of knowledge (Argote and Ingram 2000, Davenport and
Prusak 1998, Dixon 2000, Hansen 1999, Szulanski 2000). We believe that while such a
dichotomy makes sense in stable environments where firms primarily exploit knowledge that is
created by another part of the organization, it may of limited value to analyze knowledge
management needs in high-velocity environments.
In terms of the software engineering and information systems development research, our
findings point out the importance of understanding the dynamics of exploration and exploitation
in software development innovation. This finding is in stark contrast with the current focus on
software engineering research, which has almost solely focused on improving the exploitation
speeds and quality in software development. The nearly religious focus on rigid methodologies
(Lyytinen and Rose 2003, Pressman 1998), systematic process improvement programs
(Humphrey 1989), and the “silver bullet” of automating software development (Brooks 1987)
testify to this. Such approaches seem to be applicable only when development contingencies fall
within cell II, where both the technologies and the problem-solution mappings are relatively
stable. In our case, such a contingency could not be supported so organizations had to give up
their investments in process technologies since their learning modalities did not meet the needs
of hyper-competition. This suggests that software engineering and information systems
development research should be more open to analyzing the implications of different learning
modalities and environments for the development of processes, tools and methods.
Our study has several limitations. First of all, we observed only seven firms in a
particular industry at a very peculiar point in time. The specific influence of software
development and its techniques need to be considered before drawing general conclusions from
our study. It is important to note that software development generally contains the following
unique features: it is abstract in nature and therefore difficult to scale up; it is very error prone;
and it is extremely learning intensive. Second, the frantic period of the “New Economy”
certainly had an impact on the ways the firms operated. Thus, one might argue that these patterns
of hyper-learning were in fact part of the Internet hype of that period, though they still are unique
to the specific period of hyper-competition. One needs to examine other high-velocity industries
to find out whether what we saw in these seven firms are indeed more general patterns that can
be found in other high-velocity environments. We are cautiously positive that what we report
here can be more broadly applied based on similar findings from previous studies (Brown and
Eisenhardt 1997, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995).
Despite these limitations, our study provides important insights for companies competing
in high-velocity environments. Managers need to pay closer attention to the temporal and
structural gaps between explorations and exploitations. Their ability to manage this gap
significantly shapes their firm’s dynamic capabilities. Furthermore, our results suggest that
organizations competing in high-velocity environments may need to revisit their human resource
practices. Incentive structure and personnel development practices might have originally been
designed for stable environments.
Our research also provides several directions for future research. First, future research
needs to examine other hyper-competitive environments in order to validate similar
transformations in learning patterns. Furthermore, we might be able to find specific forms of
hyper-learning that are idiosyncratic to specific industries.
Second, future research needs to study the longitudinal impacts of hyper-learning. Not
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surprisingly, hyper-learning is intense and stressful. It is not clear whether organizations can
sustain such a high-level of intensity for an extended period time and what cognitive overload at
the organizational level does for organizations. In the future, it would therefore be necessary to
examine in more detail the evolutionary patterns of hyper-learning and the organizations that
pursue it- for example, there is a question of whether there are t shifts toward the punctuated
learning model and when such shifts occur, do such organizations break down easily from stress.
Our sample included firms working at the cutting edge of innovation in the software industry at
the early phase of diffusion. One can ask the question that, while these companies acquire more
capabilities and markets grow, do firms become different types of players, or do they continue to
stay at the edge of the innovation curve? One implication of our study is the size of units
engaged in hyper-learning. The dependency on smart people, informal networks and simple rules
of thumb does not easily scale up. We could also see in our organization that they emphasized
the need to find the right size for their organizational units and they were constantly struggling
with the need to scale up or down, depending on their strategic position.
Third, we also noticed three dilemmas that hyper-learning poses to organizations. First,
when organizations simultaneously pursue rapid exploration and exploitation, they have to
sacrifice the depth of knowledge when they confront resource constraints (i.e., time, resource
pool available). Hence, during hyper-competition, exploration will deal with newer, more radical
and larger sets of possibilities while the exploitation deals with less rigid certainties. This implies
higher risk and strategic vulnerability for their task execution and reduced effectiveness in
executing their tasks. Second, hyper-learning organizations have more limited ability to quickly
scale up their knowledge assets by using formal transfer knowledge mechanisms. Thus,
knowledge in hyper-learning organizations will be increasingly tacit, which is more difficult to
transfer on a large scale, thus making their growth potential smaller. Third, hyper-learning
organizations must trade-off redundancy in their learning outcomes and competencies. By
maximizing both exploration and exploitation, organizations soon face soon the limit of their
learning capabilities. One mechanism for freeing capacity is to reduce redundancy and have less
people know more. This strategy, however, will make them vulnerable for easily losing critical
knowledge and skills through hostile maneuvers by their competitors. It is not clear how
organizations can face these dilemmas of hyper-learning. Future research needs to examine these
dilemmas and organizations’ varying responses to them more carefully.
Finally, we have not addressed the issue of organizational performance- how did these
organizational strategies and changes translate into organizational effectiveness? There are
clearly other factors that influence organizational performance during hyper-competition, but
absorptive capacity and its increase is surely a critical factor.

Epilogue
The recent gloom in the economy has had its impact on the firms in the study. Two firms
went bankrupt even though the divisions included in the interviews had been financially
successful. Of the remaining five, two smaller firms have experienced a sharp drop in customer
demand as the economy shrank drastically in 2001. They are still engaged in Internet-computing
and see this as their future. They also feel that the fast change is endemic to their environment.
The remaining three firms are each part of a large parent organization and they have been able to
continue their Internet development operations and increase them. For each of the five surviving
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firms, the direction of learning has not deviated from our observations, though the pace of
change in the market (but not in technology) has slowed.
The ongoing recession of 2001 and 2002 indicates that the interviews conducted in midand late 2000 occurred at a truly exceptional point in time. In essence, we were able to capture a
synopsis of the entire hyper-competitive phenomenon by asking interviewers to reflect on its
impact on systems development. While the business context now has changed, the interviews
offer a window into understanding the hyper-competitive environment, which is triggered by
technological change. Certainly, disruptive innovations are not singular events but more
extensive processes, even though the particular period of our study was in many ways unique.
Critical parameters of the technology have changed before (e.g., mainframes and client/server)
and other periods have seen infusions of capital and research and development (e.g., electronics
in the 1960s). So it is likely that hyper-competition will take place again in IT industries.
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FIRM
Division
Focus

Firm 1

Firm 2

Firm 3

Firm 4

Firm 5

Firm 6

Firm 7

Custom software
development.
Primarily ebusiness
applications

B2B e-Business
consulting
solutions

Small spin-off of
parent. Is Webbased ASP for
parent company’s
customers

E-Business
consulting
specializes in
mobile computing

Systems
integrators to
upgrade legacy
systems to include
Web and mobile
solutions

Management
consulting,
development, IS
products,
networking and
hosting services

Interviewee
Details

Six senior
employees
including an
executive,
managers, and
software
architects
15 year old firmhad been
mainframe and
client server shop
with 500
employees in 4
locations
Several hundred

A senior manager
of an IS
development group
and one of his key
developers

The CIO, and the
five key senior
technologists who
were responsible
for the creation of
the spin-off

One of the
founding
executives who
was responsible for
development of
business processes

Part of a large,
multinational
business
consulting
company

Part of a large
financial company
with several
thousand
employees

e-Commerce
development firm
founded in 1996
starting with 6
employees

Large
multinational eBusiness
consulting and
software
development firm

Mature, large,
multinational
development and
IT service firm

Several hundred

70

Five senior
employees
including ISD
project managers,
developers, and the
senior technology
architect
Multinational eBusiness
consulting firm
founded in 1995
with several
thousand
employees
100+

E-Business
solutions
Specializes in
mobile computing
Need-based
assembling of
components and
applications
Four senior
employees
including a
systems architect,
manager, and
software engineer

200+

700+

Several hundred

40 hours

50 hours

50 hours

60 hours

37.5 hours

Varies

37.5 hours

18-30%

15-30%

< 10%

3%

3%

Uncertain

Uncertain

History

# Employees
in Division
Typical
work week
Employee
turnover /
year

One senior
manager of IT
development
services

Table 2. Firm Characteristics
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FIRM
Organizational
Structure

Firm 1

Firm 2

Firm 3

Firm 4

Firm 5

Firm 6

Firm 7

-President
-Branch manager
-Field manager
-Project manager

-Partner
-Director
-Project and
technical managers

CIO, then flat

-Client manager
-Project manager

Entirely flat except
for salary issues.

Rigid vertical
hierarchy with
formalized
methodologies for
all aspects of
business

Company is
divided into
autonomous units
based on market
sector of client

Project
Team
Characteristics

15-20 people
including:
business analysts,
architects, lead
developer, other
developers, QA
person

Architects,
analysts, expert
developers, rookie
developers

Informal

Flat with the
following roles:
project assistant,
technical lead,
designer,
information
architect

Informal

Rigid vertical
hierarchy

Broken down by
customers
(approximately
50/customer) and
subsequently by
teams (of 10 each)

Miscellaneous

80% of their
business is repeat

Roughly $750
million budget

Spun off to make
decisions at faster
pace to meet needs
of market

Company expands
through vertical
and horizontal
acquisition

20-30 projects
ongoing at any
time

Mostly analysts.
Only 30 java
coders as primary
job. 200 doing
HTML
construction and
Scriptlets, etc.
Remaining
development done
by partners.

Offices in 13
countries

Table 2. Firm Characteristics (continued)
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Rapid Expansion of Breadth of Knowledge
Active and Strategic
Active Grafting of
Gatekeeping
External Knowledge
Firm 1

Firm 2

Firm 3

Firm 4

Firm 5

Lead developers:
• The firm only develops
systems that the lead
developers want to
develop.
• The firm invests heavily
in off-site training of lead
developers.
Technology gurus:
• Technology geeks who
are deeply plugged into
external technology
communities.
• The firm piggybacks on
them for new
technologies.
New CIO:
• He was brought in
because of his substantial
experiences in Webbased systems
development.
Skill leaders:
• There are skill leaders in
eight key technology
areas.
• They are responsible for
environmental scanning.
Experts:
• They are 5-10% of
employees who are
expected to learn new
technology and share
their knowledge with the
rest of firm.

•

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
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Rapid Expansion of Depth of Knowledge
Reuse of Simple Rules
Building Peer Expertise
Network

Active purchasing of
software component
libraries from external
sources.

•

Import external software
code library from opensource community.
Outsource contractors for
specific areas.

•

Outsourcing
programmers.
Hiring a new CIO.

Web page templates are
reused.

•

•

Place people with
appropriate skills to
spread knowledge around
through mentoring
Mentors review code
written by others.

Design and analysis
patterns are reused.
Loosened up rigid
development
methodology.

•

•

A simple informal 3-step
methodology is used.

•

The firm is planning to
implement a mentoring
program.

Outsourcing web hosting
and ASP.
Purchasing components
and platforms.

•

A simple 3-step
methodology consisting
of the envision, shape,
and realize phases.

•

Each new employee is
assigned to a mentor and
a regional training
program.

Minimum purchase of
software components.
Limited contracting for
the newest technologies.

•

The development
methods for web-based
systems are much
simpler than the
traditional methods.

•

Experts are expected to
teach others through
mentoring and informal
workshops.
Projects maintain nearly
“flat” structures in order

•

•

•

The firm increasingly
relies on informal on-thejob mentoring.
Gatekeepers provide
about 75% of technical
inquiries.

190

191
•

Firm 6

Firm 7

For each key area, the
firm had 1-3 experts.
Boundary Scanners:
• They specialized in
particular technology
areas to keep up with
changes in technology.
• They work closely with
selected business
partners in order to
experiment with
emerging technologies.
Mentors:
• The top 1% of technical
support group who assist
frontline consultants is
expected to become
experts in certain areas.
• The mentors were
assigned to key strategic
projects.

•
•

•
•

Outsourcing for custom
code developments.
Extensive use of
components.

•

Analysis and overall
solution design patterns
are heavily reused.

•

Outsourcing certain
special areas.
Acquire companies
instead of outsourcing, if
necessary.

•

Most aggressively
pursuing code reuse and
formal development
methodology.
However, it focuses on
“bare essentials” of the
methodology.

•

•

to leverage individual
expertise.
Each new hire is
mentored for three
months. After the initial
mentoring period, a local
mentor will be assigned
for 2-4 years.

The firm rotates
“mentors” around
different projects to
transfer their expertise.

Table 3. Summary of the Findings
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